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Introduction 
 
The Founders consciously designed the American system to divide majoritarian en-
ergies, gridlock the government, and skew the political game towards vested inter-
ests and knowledgeable insiders. The result is a political system which dispropor-
tionately caters to small and intensely-motivated constituencies while raising the 
bar very high for majoritarian change. But, if majoritarian forces are persevering 
enough, if their repeated assaults are able to muster the forces needed across 
many places and long stretches of time, the system is able to integrate and domes-
ticate change without breaking, and without fundamentally altering itself. Judged 
by its longevity, the Fortress State is the most successful mechanism for managing 
institutional change in a large and complex society known to man. However, given 
the nature of the problems of the 21st century, the conclusion of this essay ques-
tions whether the disaggregating tendencies of American institutions will serve the 
nation well in the new millennium. 
 
American political institutions are characterized by institutional and policy stability because they 
allow organized vested interests a disproportionate amount of power to vet changes to the status 
quo relative to systems which are otherwise constituted. This is not a bug in the government’s 
operating system. It is the operating system. The story of political development in the United 
States is that of repeated assaults on the barriers, bottlenecks, and citadels erected by the Found-
ers within and between American institutions, and of vested interests having a decided ad-
vantage in limiting the possibilities for change and reform by taking advantage of them. In this 
paper, I refer to this aspect of American government as the “fortress state.” 
Civil rights, civil service reform, the building of a coherent administrative state, the crea-
tion of a health insurance system––these policies and many others took the United States longer 
to achieve, and the resulting policies were much more haphazard than they would have been in 
a different political system because of the particular arrangement and rules of American institu-
tions. Generations of Americans may have wished their government otherwise constituted than 
how they found it, but the system has demonstrated an incredible ability to resist attempts at 
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revision. An even greater number of reforms were never attempted because political power is 
not only the ability to veto change, but to deter change from ever being attempted or consid-
ered.1 
 This is not necessarily a bad thing. Societies need stable institutions, and there is much 
that the American system gets right. However, a side effect of the way power is distributed in the 
Fortress State is that it keeps presenting its citizens with arrangements and compromises that 
many do not want. Some of these arrangements are so absurd that no sane or rational person 
would design them, yet they are almost impossible to change. When this happens, the causes 
are often systemic. They have to do with the way the institutions are designed, and with the way 
power is frozen within them.  
 
THE FORTRESS STATE 
The term “fortress state” refers in these pages to how the non-hierarchical, disaggregated, and 
redundant nature of American governing institutions protects vested interests from the kinds of 
sweeping revisions that may be possible under more majoritarian, centralized, and executive sys-
tems like those of the United Kingdom and France. The fortress state, and the manner in which 
it handles change, is the reason American politics is characterized by institutional and policy sta-
bility despite fierce political contestation and a hugely diverse society. This paper argues that the 
“fortress” function is not an accidental bug in the design of American institutions, but a primary 
feature.  
                                                        
1 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56 no.4 (1962): 
947-952 
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Like a medieval castle, the fortress state is designed to funnel political invaders into bot-
tlenecks, “veto points,” at which entrenched interests can block change. It divides the energies 
of political players between branches and levels of government and makes it very difficult for a 
single interest to capture and operate them all in one swoop. The fortress state also allows highly 
educated insiders who have knowledge of the fortress state’s intricate passageways to have a 
significant advantage in maneuvering through it. Finally, like the layered and segmented walls 
and towers of a castle which contain attackers if they breach a section, the fortress state also has 
layered and independent power centers which ensure that one interest “will be unable to spread 
a general conflagration. . .”2 Vested interests can continue their defense from other citadels. This 
means that, even if part of the castle is captured and reformed, the resulting reforms will be 
partial, incomplete, and incremental. Attacking forces will be so busy fighting for the next corri-
dor, gate, or citadel, that they will often lose track of how the reforms they set out to make are 
being watered down and domesticated at every step. In this way, the fortress state is able to limit 
the scope of change so that it does not upset the balance of interests already within it. 
“Fortress state” is a descriptive and empirical term and carries with it no connotation of 
moral or normative condemnation. As George Tsebelis points out in the introduction of Veto 
Players, it is important that political scientists remain agnostic on the question of what degrees 
of institutional responsiveness are desirable for all systems at all times. Such considerations are 
relative in the extreme and rely on highly contingent and particularistic circumstances: those who 
would like to see their system otherwise constituted will want institutions to be easier to change, 
                                                        
2 Madison, James. “No. 10: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.” The Federalist 
Papers. New York: Penguin Books, 2012. 
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while those who like the status quo will want it to be easier to defend. The analysis of this paper 
proceeds under the assumption that whether one likes or dislikes the fortress state is often con-
tingent on whether one likes the status quo it protects. Whether one likes the fortress state or 
not is therefore a personal and normative question. Whether the fortress state exists, how it 
works, and how it influences policy outcomes, is an empirical and objective question and the 
subject of this paper. 
The fortress state was the result of both deliberate institutional design by highly-moti-
vated groups of interests attempting to secure their positions, and of the historical contingencies, 
circumstances, and accidents that accompanied colonization of the Eastern seaboard by an im-
poverished middling European power. The central logic of the fortress state is that institutions 
create (and often are created by) interests which benefit from them and thus will be highly mo-
tivated to defend them. This logic is universal to all political systems.3 However, the particular 
rules and institutions that govern a society, and the particular interests they defend, are contin-
gent on its history and development. A society’s institutions are unique and have a strong influ-
ence on political and government outcomes.4 While all interests in all societies look to defend 
themselves, they must use the materials they find in the societies in which they are located. By 
the same token, different institutional arrangements will emphasize different interests and allo-
cate power between them differently. The term “fortress state” therefore refers to a universal 
phenomenon––the logic of interests––filtered through uniquely American institutions which are 
animated by uniquely American values.  
                                                        
3 Moe, Terry M. "Vested Interests and Political Institutions." Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 277-318. 
4 Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, 2011. 
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
This paper, prepared for Bard College’s political science department, outlines why the American 
political system is characterized by institutional and policy stability. It proceeds under the as-
sumption that the tension between institutional change and stability is an essential and desirable 
dynamic of political development: We create institutions that stabilize our social, economic, and 
political relations and to fulfil crucial functions needed by our complex societies.5 However, insti-
tutions do not always work for everyone. They freeze relations of power in place which may be 
to the advantage of some groups of people and not others––or may be to the advantage of a 
society at one moment while being a source of dysfunction later. The resulting contestation, or 
lack of contestation, is a story of power, and is the heart of politics. The analysis proceeds under 
the assumption that institutions have the following characteristics: 
They empower small minorities of highly motivated vested interests. Institutions tend 
to survive when they are defended by a small group of highly mobilized and well-connected 
“vested interests” which benefit disproportionately from them.6 This is what provides institutions 
their hardness, staying power, and longevity. General-interest institutions, which is to say insti-
tutions whose benefits are spread thinly across large constituencies, are very difficult to maintain 
if they do not develop small, powerful, and intensely engaged constituencies.7 This is because 
the chief influence in politics is not the abstracted will of a people or considerations of a general 
interest––though these are important––but of very specific and concrete interests pursued by 
                                                        
5 Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. 38-40. 
6 Moe, Terry M. "Vested Interests and Political Institutions." Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 277-318.  
7 Patashnik, Eric M. Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy Changes Are Enacted. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2008. 
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engaged groups of people who have deeply personal motivations to get involved. As I will argue 
in Chapter 1, majoritarian interests whose potential or actual benefits are spread over large num-
bers of dispersed individuals can still have a large amount of staying power in politics if they are 
institutionalized in some way––if engaged political players are created which have incentives to 
respond to these concerns such as a majoritarian president tied to a national constituency.  
People participate in politics because they stand to gain or lose something by their in-
volvement. However, they are more responsive to incentives that are immediate and dear to 
them instead of those which are distant and do not affect them very much. That is why it is easier 
to mobilize a small and intensely interested group of people to oppose change than it is to or-
ganize a large and dispersed collection of interests to initiate change.8 It is also why, when forced 
to choose between their narrow interests and a more general interest, political actors will most 
often pick the former.  
Institutions create winners and losers. If institutions serve us well, we breathe in their 
spirit––which is to say we are more likely to invest emotionally in the ideological and normative 
structures they create to support themselves. Ideology has many purposes, but one of these is a 
rationalizing, justifying, and ennobling of what would otherwise be naked self-interest. Few peo-
ple like to think of themselves as crass and self-interested, but human beings are powerful ra-
tionalizers. We tend to gravitate towards ideas that help us explain how we already are to our-
selves and to others in a favorable light, even as our judgements––and those of others––struc-
ture our behavior. We tend, therefore, to infer general interests from our personal interests in a 
                                                        
8 Olson, Mancur Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1965. 
INTRODUCTION 7 
leap of imagination. Institutional winners, through their dominant positions, may use instru-
ments of cultural production to popularize their rationalizations, creating further supports for 
existing arrangements of power.9 If an institution does not serve us directly, on the other hand, 
we may be receptive to ideologies which are set in opposition to extant institutions and which 
explain our alienation from them. 
Institutions last; and that creates problems. Institutions are conservative beings. They 
outlast their creators, the compromises that created them, and the times to which they were 
suited. Despite the inherent conservatism and rigidity of institutions, institutional change is nec-
essary. As Edmund Burke put it in his critique of the French Revolution, “A state without some 
means of change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risk 
the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve.”10 Insti-
tutions, in order to survive and serve their purposes, need to adapt to changes in the world 
around them, but their vested interests will tend to use their political power to fight changes that 
threaten them. Reformers of all stripes must contend with this reality when attempting to change 
systems. They will often find themselves limited in the kinds of change they can pursue by the 
defenses vested interests create.  
 
All of these characteristics of political institutions have consequences for effective government, 
political reform, and social change.   
 
                                                        
9 Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
10 Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France: And on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London, 
Relative to That Event; by Edmund Burke. London: J. Dodsley, 1790. 
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PLAN FOR THIS PAPER 
In this paper, I will attempt to create a simple but comprehensive framework for understanding 
American government which can apprehend how its parts relate to the whole. This does not just 
refer to how individual institutions relate to each other, but also different kinds of interests, po-
litical players, and political theories. In Chapter 1, I develop a back-of-the-napkin framework 
which will allow me to compare how the American political system is more responsive to some 
categories of interests and not others, and what this means for the character of our nation’s 
politics. I draw upon academic literature to distinguish between the interests of “the few,” “the 
many,” and “the one.” In Chapter 2, I examine the four strategies employed by the American 
fortress state to skew the political playing field in the favor of small and intense constituencies. I 
also explore the consequences of these strategies. Finally, in the conclusion, I reflect upon the 
current trajectory of American political development.  
 
  
Chapter 1: The Institutionalization of Political Power 
 
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them 
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different 
circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, con-
cerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; 
an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and 
power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting 
to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them 
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and op-
press each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this pro-
pensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occa-
sion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient 
to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. . . The 
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of mod-
ern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and or-
dinary operations of the government [my italics]. 
James Madison, The Federalist, No. 10 
 
 
This chapter leverages political science literature on interests, political participation, and political 
organization to present a back-of-the-napkin framework to compare how the fortress state is 
more responsive to some kinds of interests and less responsive to others.  
Societies are composed of many different kinds of interests. Differences of identity, 
wealth, class, geography, political affiliation, culture, diet, profession, income, gender, taste, re-
ligion, values, race, etc––create divisions within society which can become the cause of faction, 
dissidence, conflict, and change. We may invest these differences with meaning and become at-
tached to them, or we might overlook them entirely. Depending on how they are or are not em-
phasized, these interests can bring a group of people together, while others can drive that very 
same group of people apart. A key factor that determines what interest a particular group of 
people will respond to has to do with the intensity with which they feel that particular interest. 
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People will tend to respond most readily, and take the most extensive and costly actions, to de-
fend the interests they feel most personally and intimately.  
That is why, within realms of politics which have high bars of entry to deter the disinter-
ested, the interests of small minorities which feel their interests intensely, and which face few 
barriers to collective action, will tend to predominate. This paper refers to these interests as 
those of “the few.” My definition includes narrow economic interests which are not shared by 
the whole community, such as the economic interest of bank. It also includes identarian interests, 
which touch upon the recognition and dignity of minority social groups.11 This paper argues that 
the American political system was designed to give these interests a disproportionate advantage 
in navigating our institutions, and therefore a large amount of power over the structuring of our 
institutions and the character of our national policy.  
However, there are other categories of interests which are important in the process of 
political development. The first of these is the interests of “the many,” which are dispersed over 
large constituencies. Given that individual members of these constituencies feel these interests 
only weakly, many pluralists have argued that majoritarian interests, those of the “common 
good,” have no substantive meaning or force in politics. This would be true if it were not for the 
fact that man is a social animal. Through the spreading of norms, ideologies, and values––and 
through our tendency to react emotionally when these norms are broken or disrespected––large 
masses of disorganized human beings are able to exert pressure on a person or institution to 
                                                        
11 Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2018. 
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shame or coerce them into abiding by their will.12 In this way, institutions and individuals can be 
held accountable to large and dispersed interests which, while disorganized, are coded into the 
social norms and morals of a large population. 
Finally, the interests of “the one,” the interests of the state, are also of great conse-
quence. In order to survive as units of political organization, sovereign states must be able to 
direct their resources in something approaching a rational way, channel the interests of groups 
and individuals towards positive ends, and to manage social schisms so that they do not get out 
of hand. Through a process of trial and error, we have developed institutions within the modern 
state to do these things more or less well. 
This paper assumes that societies may give priority to any combination of these interests 
through how they structure their norms, procedures, and institutions. Giving priority to one in-
terest necessarily comes at the expense of the other two. Different societies arrive at different 
balances between these three interests through the process, conflicts, and accidents of political 
development. 
 
THE INTERESTS OF “THE FEW” 
The most relevant interests to discussions about the fortress state are those of “the few,” collo-
quially referred to as “special interests.” These are interests which are concentrated in small con-
stituencies. The intensity of the interests in question provide strong incentives for these people 
to develop and exert political power in a sustained way. To call these interests “special” is not to 
                                                        
12 Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. 34-48. 
THE FORTRESS STATE 12 
impinge on the legitimacy of their activism, but simply to observe that their activities follow a 
particular logic that sets them apart.  
In his works The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur 
Olson hammers out a framework for thinking about how special interests function in society. He 
convincingly demonstrates that it is harder to organize effective political action than our popular 
myths about democratic participation generally allow for. This is both because of the inherent 
costs of political organization in a mass democracy and because of the collective action problems 
facing large groups of individuals. Organizers bear most of the start-up costs of a political enter-
prise and must share the benefits with a larger group. Members may be reluctant to join in the 
enterprise unless it has already been demonstrated that it can be successful. Even then, they may 
stay uninvolved and freeride on the organizers’ success. These collective action problems which 
stand in the way of effective political organization are obstacles to groups of all sizes and degrees 
of coherence. However, smaller groups which feel their common interests intensely will be easier 
to organize than larger groups which feel their interests only weakly. This reality leads to an im-
balance in participation in the system of public pressure between groups which are small, con-
centrated, and organized, and majority interests which are large, dispersed, and absent.13  
An offshoot of “special interests” are what political scientists refer to as “vested inter-
ests.” They are a distinctive subset because they are special interests which “arise from the very 
institutions whose stability and change we want to explain. . . Vested interests arise in all govern-
ment institutions, in all countries of the world, because certain people and groups of people 
                                                        
13 Schattschneider, Elmer E. The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. Cengage Learn-
ing, 1975. 
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benefit from what the institutions do or make possible––for example, through the services they 
provide, the supplies they purchase, or the jobs they fund.”14 Vested interests, in political science 
lingo, refers to groups of people which benefit materially from government institutions or pro-
grams. Like the broader category “special interests,” vested interests tend to be small and con-
centrated minorities which feel their common interests intensely, and thus have strong incen-
tives to overcome their collective action problems and get organized. Vested interests are 
unique, however, because their self-interestedness leads them to defend the institutions against 
revision. Their influence and political activism gives institutions their hardness and conservative 
character. In political science, unlike in normal conversation, the term “vested interest” carries 
with it no negative connotation; it is simply meant as an empirical category.  
A good example of a vested interest is the intense interest created among retirees by 
Social Security and Medicare programs. The benefits distributed by these programs have led re-
tired people to exert sustained influence in American politics primarily to defend and expand 
Medicare and Social Security through such organizations as the American Association of Retired 
Persons (AARP), which has more than 38 million members and a yearly income of $1.6 billion as 
of 2018.15 This organization allows retirees to project power into the field of force where politics 
takes place. Their power was on display in 2005 when President Bush attempted reforms which 
would have partially privatized the system and shifted it from a pay-as-you-go model to a per-
sonal account model. The AARP spent $36 million on lobbying opposing the proposal.16 According 
                                                        
14 Moe, Terry M. "Vested Interests and Political Institutions." Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 287. 
15 American Association for Retired Persons. Consolidated Financial Statements Together with Report of Independ-
ent Certified Private Accountants, AARP, December 31, 2017 and 2016. 2018. 
16 "Jeffrey H. Birnbaum - On Issues From Medicare to Medication, AARP's Money Will Be There." The Washington 
Post. April 24, 2007. Accessed April 26, 2019. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2007/04/23/AR2007042301760.html. 
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to OpenSecrets.org, this is the highest yearly lobbying expenditure the AARP has ever recorded. 
To provide another example, defense contractors and their employees have a vested interest in 
government defense programs that distribute funds to them in exchange for the guns, planes, 
and other systems that they produce. Given that Congress oversees the defense procurement 
process, defense programs double as virtual jobs programs to be distributed by lucky Congress-
men, and competition among those interests is fierce.17 Teachers have a vested interest in how 
schools are run and will tend to have a strong impact on school board elections through the po-
litical activities of their unions.18 Agricultural corporations have vested interests in agricultural 
subsidies and will fight to keep them in place.  
These people, feeling the effects of these institutions deeply and personally, are highly 
motivated to use their resources to develop political power and to see it used to secure their 
interests. If they succeed in institutionalizing their activism, such as through the creation of self-
sustaining professional organizations like the AARP, unions, business associations, or other kinds 
of groups, these interests will have staying power. Meanwhile, less concentrated and organized 
interests might come into being only sporadically, if at all. Jonathan Rauch, author of Demoscle-
rosis highlighted this when he noted, “Amateur activists can always drop the cause and go home, 
but for professionals, the cause pays the mortgage.” Professional organizers like the leadership 
of the AARP will keep the cause going, keep the vested interest they represent “in being” and 
                                                        
17 Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Decay from the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of De-
mocracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015. 
18 DiSalvo, Daniel. Government against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences. New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2015. 
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engaged, and will face strong incentives to press for their clients’ interests at the expense of the 
needs of others because their jobs and the health of their organizations depend on it. 
Democratic political systems tend to provide pluralities of intense and organized interests 
means and mechanisms by which to influence public policy, but together the narrow interests of 
“the few” do not necessarily add up to a single, general, coherent, and sovereign interest. In fact, 
the interests that these players pursue will often conflict with each other, and with the broader 
interests of society taken as a whole. For example, many provisions that teachers’ unions insist 
on in collective bargaining contracts, such as rules that make it almost impossible to evaluate 
teachers or to fire them when they are performing poorly, might be good for teachers––but they 
are often bad for students, parents, and education outcomes.19  
 
THE INTERESTS OF “THE MANY” 
In theory, all citizens of a country have an interest in general goods such as defense, clean air, 
clean water, roads, good schools, good government, economic growth, fair economic rules, a 
growing job market, etc. This paper terms these interests, “the many.”  
Large majorities may be in favor of these goods, but their benefits will tend to be dis-
persed thinly across large populations. Many pluralists have argued that these majority interests 
have no substantive content since few political actors will be motivated by self-interest enough 
to defend them. This paper dissents from this view and argues instead that the moral standards 
and judgements of a community as a whole matter. The pluralist rational choice paradigm fails 
                                                        
19 Ibid. 
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to account for the ways in which natural human sociability helps us to cooperate more often and 
on a much grander scale than simple calculations of self-interest.  
The rational choice paradigm, which focuses on man’s ability to make rational choices 
based on calculations of self-interest, was imported into political science with the publication of 
Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy in 1957.20 The contributions that the ra-
tional economic man has made to the study of politics have been great, but an increasing num-
ber of political scientists are realizing that it is also necessary to account for the powerful influ-
ences that religion, ideology, and other potentially irrational structures of belief have on politi-
cal development. Francis Fukuyama’s analysis in The Origins of Political Order cites the works of 
psychologists and evolutionary biologists in an attempt to do just that. 
  Fukuyama’s most basic framework boils down to this: “[in prehistoric times], human be-
ings in effect entered into an arms race with one another, the winners of which were those 
groups that could create more complex forms of social organization based on new cognitive 
abilities to interpret each other’s behavior.”21  
 In Fukuyama’s model, the following abilities and tendencies are empirically observed in 
human beings. They go a long way to explain why ideologies and ideas are not just rationaliza-
tions created by rationally self-interested people, but have a life all their own which needs to be 
taken seriously:  
• Our capacity for abstraction and theorizing; 
                                                        
20 The literature also includes such foundational works as James M. Buchanan’s The Calculus of Consent and Man-
cur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action. 
21 Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. 34-35. N. K. Humphrey, “The Social Function of Intellect,” in P.P.G. Bateson and R. A. 
Hinde, Growing Points in Ethology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 303-17; Richard Alexander, 
How Did Humans Evolve?: 
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• Our capacity to receive and transmit our abstractions and theories through language; 
• Our tendency to become attached to theories, norms, and structures that harmonize 
with our subject positions, and to imbue them with emotional meaning; 
• Our tendency to react emotionally when those norms and structures are violated or dis-
respected; 
• Our tendency to crave recognition, an “intersubjective state of mind by which one hu-
man being acknowledges the worth of another human being”;  
• Our tendency to seek personal and group recognition through and from theories, insti-
tutions, and norms.22 
The integration of these postulates poses particularly thorny problems for political scientists 
studying the development of institutions. This is because it is difficult to tell whether a political 
actor is invoking an ideological framework because it serves the purpose they would pursue an-
yway out of self-interest, because they earnestly believe that the ideology is empirically or nor-
matively true, or because they crave recognition for themselves or their group, or any combina-
tion of the above. This paper assumes that the three often go together, if not always within the 
same people, then definitely within the same movement, providing the balm that holds it to-
gether. This is true both of groups which belong to “the few” and of those which belong to “the 
many,” though in the case of “the many,” ideology and norms tend to do a lot more work than 
organization: through the spreading of norms, ideologies, and values––and through our ten-
dency to react emotionally when these norms are broken or disrespected––large masses of 
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disorganized human beings are able to exert pressure on a person or institution to shame or co-
erce them into abiding by their will.23 In this way, institutions and individuals can be held ac-
countable to large and dispersed interests which, while disorganized, are coded into the social 
norms and morals of a large population.  
However, this aspect of human sociability is not an unqualified force for good, nor will it 
always work to the advantage of a society. As the Athenians learned during their long war with 
Sparta, dispersed and unaccountable majorities are excitable and mercurial and may sacrifice 
long-term good sense, caution, sustainability, or deliberation for actions that feel good in the 
moment. They may fall prey to demagogues and populists who excite base passions and cause 
them to take action which have the potential to ruin an individual, an institution, or a society. 
They may also become divided and polarized, turning their moral disapprobation against each-
other along societal cleavages which may become difficult for the state to manage. Finally, norms 
and morals may change or decay as a society changes, grows, or becomes more diverse. That is 
why one of the crucial functions of the modern state is to harness the creative power of these 
dynamics while mitigating their potentially harmful effects. 
 
THE INTERESTS OF “THE ONE” 
Natural human sociability can misfire, which is why societies have developed mechanisms which 
manage the scope of social conflicts, filter the preferences of “the many,” and channel them in 
                                                        
23 N. K. Humphrey, “The Social Function of Intellect,” in P.P.G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, Growing Points in Ethology 
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constructive directions. For example, the guilt of criminal defendants is determined by carefully 
administered rules of procedure within a closed institution instead of an open democratic vote. 
Another example is how modern institutions space out the election of government officers. This 
gives statesmen a chance to govern without constantly having to worry about pleasing the mob. 
Yet another example is how branches of government which have more frequent elections serve 
as an outlet for discontent. Subversive energy which might undermine the state is instead fed 
back into it to keep the governing majority accountable. 
Mechanisms which filter and channel the political energies of “the few” and “the many” 
in directions which are constructive for the whole society are essential to the survival of a state 
as a coherent unit of social organization. These mechanisms emerged in what Fukuyama termed, 
“a manner roughly comparable to biological evolution.”24 He explained that, “the forms of polit-
ical organization employed by different groups of human beings have varied, and those forms 
that were more successful––meaning those that could generate greater military and economic 
power––displaced those that were less successful.”25 Over the course of history, the most suc-
cessful of these forms has been the sovereign state. If a state is to survive as a unit in competition 
with other units of social organization, it must be able to defend and pursue its own interests in 
something approaching a concerted and rational way. Political scientists R. Kent Weaver and Bert 
A. Rockman, authors and editors of Do Institutions Matter?, noted that: 
. . . all governments need to set and maintain priorities among the many conflicting 
demands made upon them so that they are not overwhelmed and bankrupted; to 
target resources where they are most effective; to innovate when old policies have 
failed; to coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent whole; to be able to 
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25 Ibid. 
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impose losses on powerful groups; to represent diffuse, unorganized interests in 
addition to concentrated, well organized ones; to ensure effective implementation 
of government policies once they have been decided upon; to ensure policy stabil-
ity so that policies have time to work; to make and maintain international commit-
ments in the realm of trade and national defense to ensure their long-term well-
being; and, above all, to manage political cleavages to ensure that society does not 
degenerate into civil war.26 
 
This paper terms these needs the interests of “the one,” the interests of the state. Historically, 
these interests used to be embodied in a single person, usually a hereditary monarch, who con-
sidered the whole of the country his personal patrimony. More recently, it has come to be em-
bodied in unitary executives overseeing national bureaucracies which are held accountable to 
the interests of a society through national elections, national political parties, and democratic 
norms. However, given the haphazard and accumulative nature of political development and the 
interest competition faced by monarchs and executives from the “many” and the “few”, it is not 
a given that states will be able to perform all of the functions above well, or at all.  
 
BALANCING THE THREE 
Through the process and accidents of political development, different societies have arrived at 
different balances between the interests of the “many,” the “few,” and the “one.” We can discern 
how some institutions, procedures, and mechanisms of power are more to the advantage of 
some of these interests, which is to say that a political system will be more responsive to their 
concerns and override those of the others. The disorganized “many” are advantaged by institu-
tions which simplify power and make it harder for political actors to divide and rule, such as 
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simple and hierarchical government structures, strong national parties, strong presidents with 
national electorates, unitary states, and a concentrated national media. The organized “few” are 
advantaged by institutions which disaggregate, hide, and quarantine power while allowing highly 
educated and specialized actors influence through a backdoor such as labyrinthian government 
structures, federalism, checks and balances, judicialized decision-making, weak parties, greater 
numbers of veto points, fragmented legislative bodies, and fragmented media landscapes. The 
interests of the state embodied in the “one” are best pursued by institutions which concentrate 
power in the hands of a unitary head of state: historically a monarch or dictator, more recently a 
chief executive presiding over a national administrative state.  
 The design, arrangement, defenses, and ideological supports of institutions freeze partic-
ular relations of power in place. These frozen structures allocate power and legitimacy in differ-
ent proportions to the “many,” the “few,” and the “one.” The argument of this paper revolves 
around the claim that the American system was created to disproportionately advantage the in-
terests of the “few” over those of the “many” and the “one;” This is because the founders were 
members of an economic elite born of the unequal divisions of property that occurred under 
colonial charters. These elites feared that the coming of democracy would create an alliance of 
the “many” with the “one” against the “few,” to bring about “a rage for paper money, for an 
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,” 
in the words of James Madison.27 The result of their anxieties, political activism, and planning has 
demonstrated remarkable resilience as a form of social organization: the American fortress state. 
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Chapter 2: Fortress America 
 
It is reasonable to assume that those who dislike the status quo will prefer a politi-
cal system with the capacity to make changes quickly, while advocates of the status 
quo will prefer a system that produces policy stability. 
George Tsebelis, Veto Players 
 
The term “fortress state” refers in these pages to how the non-hierarchical, disaggregated, and 
redundant nature of American governing institutions protects vested interests from the kinds of 
sweeping revisions that may be possible under more majoritarian, centralized, and executive 
systems like those of the United Kingdom and France. In contrast to more majoritarian systems 
of government which employ institutional arrangements which are more to the advantage of 
large, dispersed interests, or to more executive systems which grant the state more administra-
tive autonomy, the American system is built like a fortress to protect the interests of the orga-
nized few at the expense of large majorities and the rational ordering of the state.  
The Founders, who were members of a small economic elite born of an unequal distri-
bution of property during colonization, feared that their interests might suffer if a caesarist alli-
ance between the “many” and the “one” were to come to power. They most feared that such 
an alliance would result in an abolition of their privileges, wealth, and status. As James Madison 
explained in Federalist 51, “if a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the mi-
nority will be insecure.” The solution was to create institutions which have a tendency to dis-
aggregate, quarantine, and isolate power so that “society itself will be broken into so many 
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parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be 
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”28  
The Founders were not worried for nothing. At the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, there were very real movements and realities which impinged on the interests of mon-
eyed property, and there were very real economic gains to be harvested from the creation of a 
national government capable of repaying its debts, taming its western frontier, protecting the 
rights of contract from infringement by state legislatures, protecting domestic manufactures, 
and putting down slave revolts.29 So present and immediate were these fears that Madison 
enumerates them explicitly in his arguments for federalism in Federalist No. 10: “[Under a fed-
eralist constitution], A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of 
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole 
body of the Union than a particular member of it.”30 
The fortress state the Founders built is an institutional order of redundant and non-hier-
archical authority where different parts of the government are empowered to block one-an-
other. The ultimate result of its design is to make institutional and policy change difficult to 
achieve and easy for entrenched interests to veto and influence. The American fortress state 
achieves a striking amount of policy and institutional stability in four ways: 
1. First, it disaggregates political power in many political units which have different constit-
uencies and face different incentives. By doing this, the fortress state makes it harder for 
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a single large interest to capture the whole system and easier for special interests to di-
vide and rule.  
2. Second, the fortress state empowers these many and diverse political units to check one-
another. This create labyrinthian gauntlets of “veto points” which make it easier for 
vested interests to veto policy or institutional change than for the government to make 
policy or change.  
3. Third, through its complexity, the fortress state raises the individual cost of political ac-
tion: highly educated insiders who have knowledge of the fortress state’s intricate pas-
sageways have a significant advantage in maneuvering through it, while disengaged and 
dispersed majorities are discouraged from political action.  
4. Fourth, if all else fails, the fortress state preserves itself by acceding to change incremen-
tally and incompletely. If those attacking the fortress state are persevering enough, if their 
repeated assaults are able to muster the forces needed across many places and long 
stretches of time, the system is able to give without breaking. Reformers who succeeded 
in institutionalizing their change then discover that they too can use the fortress state to 
defend what they created.  
In order to appreciate the ways in which the American system is unique, it is necessary to 
compare it to the governments of other countries. In the following sections, I will be making 
reference most often to the relatively unitary, majoritarian, and executive governments of 
France and the United Kingdom, which are both about the size of one American state. In 
making these comparisons, I do not suggest that the United States might be able to reach the 
same level of administrative or political centralization as these European countries, nor that 
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the Founders could have created a unitary state at the Constitutional Convention in 1786. I 
make these comparisons because France and the United Kingdom are societies which have 
arrived at governments which are democratic, administratively capable, and governed by the 
rule of law following different paths of development than the United States. Along the way, 
they made different choices as to how to institutionalize the interests of the one, the few, 
and the many in their political systems. The very existence of these systems demonstrates 
that the American fortress state is not the only form of free or democratic government that 
can exist. By comparing them, we can learn what the fortress state does well and what other 
systems which balance forces differently do better. 
 
DIVIDE AND RULE 
James Madison observes in Federalist 51 that, “In the compound republic of America, the power 
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,” the states and the 
federal government, “and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and sepa-
rate departments.” By attaching these departments and levels to different constituencies with 
different interests, further dilution is achieved: “The House of Representatives being to be 
elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors 
chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to 
cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.”31 The ulti-
mate objective of this structure is to divide the political energies and interests of American 
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society “into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of 
the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”32  
The structure works exactly as the Founders intended: even in the modern day, the for-
tress state divides the energies of political players between levels and branches of government 
which are responsive to different constituencies and incentives. This disaggregation of power 
makes the whole system harder to keep accountable to the whole of the people, and easier for 
parts of the system to be kept accountable to small and interested minorities. It also introduces 
collective action problems which make it very difficult interests to coordinate across branches 
and levels of government, making the formation of broad-based and programmatic political par-
ties very difficult.  
This pattern is pervasive: from local school boards and other forms of local government 
which often have their elections at different times than state or national bodies, to the Senate 
which only allows a third of its members to go up for reelection every two years; from the Elec-
toral College which subdivides the American presidential vote into separate states, to federalism 
which parcels out sovereign power to different political actors with different constituencies; from 
decentralized legislatures whose members are held accountable not to national political parties 
with national platforms but to particularistic local districts, to the way in which such disaggre-
gated legislatures tend to cede their lawmaking authority to secondary bodies which operate 
under different rules of appointment and procedure. The American system lacks a single power 
center to rule them all by design. 
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A good contrast to this aspect of the fortress state is the system of the French Fifth Republic. 
Having learned from their disastrous history of fragmented parliamentary government, the 
French built their system to concertedly unite and strengthen rather than divide and weaken 
majoritarian energies. The total renewal of the political class in a single election, as occurred as 
a result of the 2017 election in France, is impossible under the American system by design. By 
contrast, the French system is biased towards the election of a strong unitary executive sup-
ported by a strong legislative majority, ultimately accountable to the whole of the French people 
and not narrow special interests.  
French elections proceed in four rounds: two rounds of presidential elections and two 
rounds of legislative elections. In the first round of presidential elections, all registered political 
parties run a candidate for president. If a candidate wins a majority of votes, then that candidate 
becomes president. If, as more often happens, there is no immediate victor, a run-off election is 
held between the two candidates who earned the most votes in the first round. While more im-
mediate and intense considerations might prevail during the party primaries and the first round 
of the presidential election, the second round confronts voters with a single, uniform, and simple 
choice. Due to the compounded and undivided nature of the electorate, the focus in these elec-
tions is on national, programmatic issues which touch the greatest numbers of voters possible 
rather than on backroom maneuvering, identarian litmus tests, targeted appeals, or particularis-
tic payoffs. In 2017, the French people chose to vote by a two to one ratio for Emmanuel Macron, 
a centrist, pro-European candidate promising incremental labor reforms over Marine Le Pen, a 
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far-right populist candidate in favor of drastic curbs on immigration, renegotiation of EU treaties, 
and an in-out referendum over France’s membership in the EU. 
Once the presidential elections are complete, the energies of the electorate are chan-
neled into two more rounds of elections, this time for the legislators of the National Assembly, 
which is composed of five hundred and seventy-seven single-member districts. Turnout drops 
sharply during these elections, from 74.56% in the second round of the 2017 presidential election 
to 42.64% in the second round of the 2017 legislative elections.33 Once again, the preferences of 
small and intense minorities is filtered through a two-round system. In the first round, all regis-
tered parties may field candidates. Candidates have only one month to campaign. The small size 
of districts and relatively greater number of representatives forces legislators to rely on the brand 
of their political party and presidential candidate instead of on their prowess as campaigners, 
fundraisers, and insiders like in the American system. In the second round of legislative elections, 
the two candidates which garnered the largest share of the vote go head-to-head, often in elec-
tions dominated by the energized partisans of the victorious president. The victors become leg-
islators in the National Assembly. Given how this system channels and manages political energy, 
the President of Fifth Republic is practically guaranteed either an absolute or coalitional majority 
in the National Assembly at the beginning of his term of office.  
After France’s disastrous history of fragmented parliamentary government, the constitu-
tion of the French Fifth Republic vests a dizzying amount of power in its chief executive. The 
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president can organize the bureaucracy, choose his Prime Minister, pass laws by putting them to 
a referendum (bypassing the legislature entirely), trigger legislative elections in the lower house 
to ask the French people to render verdict on a particular issue, and rule by decree for a limited 
period of time in exceptional circumstances. In cases where the president does not possess a 
parliamentary majority, it is the Prime Minister which structures the government, taking on a 
role not dissimilar to a Prime Minister in a Westminster system. The president may also, through 
his Prime Minister, create government regulations by decree which cannot conflict with the enu-
merated areas of law reserved to the legislature.  
An independent check on government power exists through France’s Constitutional 
Council and other courts. However, unlike the American Supreme court, these courts rule only 
on narrow constitutional and procedural questions. In the American system, the Supreme Court 
is considered to have vast powers of interpretation over a constitution and legal statutes which 
are vague in its prescriptions. French courts interpret law under a civil law constitution which is 
very specific in its prescriptions and have been leery of being seen as overruling the will of the 
French people. 
The French government’s hierarchical nature, centralizing a great amount of power in its 
chief executive and strong political parties ultimately accountable to the verdict of an unmedi-
ated majority of French electors, makes it both highly responsive to majoritarian concerns and 
highly capable of acting concertedly to defend the state––on paper. However, it is important not 
to reify the government of France too much. France possesses a highly efficient and well-orga-
nized administrative state which is able to deliver on public services in a way which the American 
system is incapable. However, France is not known for its agility or reformism. In practice, France 
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is home to very strong vested interests which have developed the power to stop change through 
other means. Instead of blocking change within the halls of the Congress, as special interests 
might be easily able to do in the American system, French vested interests have learned that they 
can immobilize the government by taking the economy hostage, such as by going on strike, by 
blocking major arterial highways, and by rioting in the streets. This is the fate that many reforms 
proposed by Emmanuel Macron are suffering at the hands of the gilets jaune, a decentralized 
protest movement that arose in response to his government’s attempt to pass a tax on motorists.  
However, it also is important to note the differences between this state of things, which 
we may describe as a fortress society, and the American fortress state. France’s institutional re-
ality benefits certain types of vested interests over others. France can be immobilized by orga-
nized vested interests such as unions or by decentralized protest movements animated by vague 
popular anger and dégagisme such as the gilets jaune. In the United States, the effects of such a 
conflagration are limited by the United States’ decentralized geography and institutional frame-
work.  
Moneyed property interests do not have the same power to veto change within the 
French system as they do in the American system either. The fact that the French government 
was able to implement a 75% tax rate on earnings above €1m over the years 2013 and 2014 
despite resistance and opposition from wealthy French residents is evidence of this.34 In the 
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American system, a 75% tax on wealthy individuals would never make it out of committee. These 
are the difference between a lean state and a fortress state. 
 
The French example demonstrates what the American Founders knew very well: when building 
institutions, rules and incentives matter. They can be arranged to advantage some kinds interests 
over others and can be biased towards certain political outcomes. The argument of this paper is 
that the American fortress state biases political results in the United States away from rapid in-
stitutional and policy change towards greater institutional and policy stability––away from ma-
joritarian concerns towards the concerns of smaller, more concentrated vested interests. It does 
this by creating a structure which is easily dominated by small minorities of interested insiders, a 
structure which disaggregates and quarantines political power non-hierarchically into many parts 
and sections which are accountable to different interests. This makes it difficult for any single 
interest to command the whole all at once, as is possible and even encouraged in the French 
system. 
 In the next section, we will explore how this disaggregation of power is paired with the 
fortress state’s second strategy of defense: the creation of overlapping lines of authority and the 
empowering of different parts of the government to block one-another. 
 
CREATING VETO POINTS AND VETO PLAYERS 
A disaggregated institution may avoid being prone to gridlock if it establishes clear lines of au-
thority and jurisdiction. However, the Founders designed the American system of government 
with the intention that it would gridlock itself. They followed Montesquieu’s prescription that 
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“Political liberty is. . .  present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally been observed 
that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits. . . So that one 
cannot abuse power, power must check power by the arrangement of things [my italics].”35 The 
Founders created a government which is not only non-hierarchical, but also characterized by 
overlapping spheres of authority between branches and levels of government which are empow-
ered to block one-another.  
 Americans today see this form of government––checks and balances––as a crucial safe-
guard against the arbitrary and tyrannical use of state power. The Founders shared this view. 
Hamilton argues in Federalist 73 that: 
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of pre-
venting good ones. . . But this objection will have little weight with those who can 
properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws. . . 
They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, 
and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, 
as more likely to do good than harm. . . The injury which may possibly be done by 
defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of prevent-
ing a number of bad ones.36 
 
While it may be difficult to objectively judge what actions are arbitrary and tyrannical, it is easy 
to see how the American system makes any concerted use of political power difficult. Checks and 
balances ensure that the American system has many points at which political actors can halt col-
lective action in its tracks by exercising a veto or withholding consent. The fortress state therefore 
funnels political invaders into bottlenecks at which entrenched interests can block or water down 
change. As George Tsebelis observes in his book Veto Players, the American political system 
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possesses many more “veto players” than more majoritarian and executive countries like France 
and the United Kingdom. This skews the battle towards status quo forces and leads to greater 
institutional and policy stability.37  
 
Let’s take the issue of bureaucratic structuring as an example to illustrate this reality. In how it 
approaches bureaucratic structure, the American system is very different than that of the British 
and French, where decisions about how the bureaucracy is to be organized originate with the 
executive and are ratified by Parliament (the British system) or are simply the province of the 
executive (the French system).  
The American Constitution allocates to Congress the enumerated powers of the govern-
ment, such as the power to collect taxes, to regulate interstate commerce, to raise and maintain 
an army or a navy, and so on, but does anyone expect Congress to do any of those things itself? 
No, Congress delegates its power to agencies which it creates, regulates, and funds, such as the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), many consumer health, environmental, financial, and social insti-
tutions, the Department of Defense, among many, many others. As a result, decisions about bu-
reaucratic structure originate within Congress and are strongly influenced by the players, rules, 
incentives, and structure at play within it. 
By what process does Congress structure bureaucracy? Congress is not a unitary actor. It 
is a collective body which can only act after a laborious process of aggregation of its members’ 
preferences.38 Like the parliaments in British and French systems, Congress is composed of two 
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houses. Unlike the British and French, however, the Americans requires agreement between 
both houses for a bill to leave Congress.39 Neither the Senate nor House of Representatives are 
unitary actors either. They are bodies composed of different numbers of legislators elected from 
different kinds of districts and serving for different term lengths, and thus responsive to different 
incentives. As a result, the House and Senate have different institutional characters and balance 
interests within them differently. This makes them less likely to have the same preferences on a 
given issue.  
The internal organization of legislatures––their party systems, issue caucuses, committee 
systems, parliamentary rules, and legislative pipeline––impose order on what would otherwise 
be a chaotic free-for-all. These rules can be used to empower some interests and disempower 
others. For example, by tying legislators to a centralized party leadership which can motivate 
them with rules, punishments, and rewards, strong majorities can govern as if they were unitary 
actors. We have seen how the French political system, through a creative use of election timing 
and small legislative districts, ties the electoral fate of legislators to that of political parties and 
national candidates. The sheer number of representatives in the National Assembly, the polari-
zation of French politics, and strong tribal loyalties also lead to a subsuming of the individual 
within the group. The French and British examples tech us that legislatures can overcome their 
internal collective action problems and act as unitary actors tied to majoritarian executives 
through rules which encourage the rise of strong legislative parties.  
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The institutions of Congress, by contrast, follow the Madisonian model which divides in-
stitutions “into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or 
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”40 Eric 
Schickler observed in his extensive history of Congressional institutional development that no 
single interest or incentive predominates in Congress in a stable or durable way. This leads to a 
disjointed pluralism that “militates against any overarching order in legislative politics.”41 Con-
gressional parties must compete for influence over the decisions of legislators with policy inter-
ests and lobbyists, individual power bases, presidents, other members of the executive branch, 
the divergent reelection interests of individual members, and the shared electoral considerations 
of legislative majorities. When change does occur, it is because of unstable and opportunistic 
alliances between disjointed interests acting for their own reasons. If a legislature composed of 
such unstable alliances were allowed to change policy and the institutions at will, there would be 
chaos. That is why the Founders paired their decentralized, disaggregating structure with checks 
and balances, which drastically increases the cost and difficulty of making decisions. They did this 
not just between institutions, but within institutions as well. American politics is therefore char-
acterized by the sheer number of political players possessing a veto over political action.  
In order to structure bureaucracy, Congress is required to pass a bill delegating its enu-
merated powers to an institution. At every stage, the bill must go under the knives of veto play-
ers whose assent must be secured before a bill can proceed to the next veto point.  
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In most cases, the gauntlet will look something like this: A bill is introduced in the House 
or Senate. It is referred to the proper committee, which may refer it to a subcommittee. Com-
mittee and subcommittee members, especially the Chairs, have a lot of influence over whether 
a bill is considered, the content of the bill, and whether the bill is referred by majority vote to 
the House or Senate calendars. The leaderships of the House and Senate have a lot of power to 
choose which of their members sit on committees, potentially providing filter which keeps cer-
tain legislators from ever working on a policy area they may have radical views on. The leader-
ships of the House and Senate also choose which bills to take off the legislative calendars so 
they can be put to a vote on the House and Senate floor. They can also influence the rules by 
which a vote takes place, such as whether amendments are allowed. 218 votes in the House 
and 51 votes in the Senate are needed to pass a bill. In a highly polarized Congress, small 
groups of legislators or individual Senators can defect. A bill may need to be substantially al-
tered in order to gain the requisite number of votes. In the Senate, on some matters, 60 votes 
may be necessary if a single Senator stands to filibuster a bill.  
If a bill passes even one house of Congress, which is not a given, it must be passed in 
identical form in the other house, which means it must go through the same process from the 
very beginning. Often, when a bill is passed by both houses, the two versions conflict. In these 
cases, the House and Senate often appoint a conference committee to reconcile the two ver-
sions. These conference committees are typically composed of the senior members of the 
standing committees which first recommended the bill. Conference committees have a lot of 
influence over a bill’s final form, especially through the Conference Chair who may waive or in-
terpret rules as to how a bill can or cannot be changed during reconciliation. Once a conference 
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committee completes its report, the report is referred to the House and Senate. No amend-
ments are allowed to this final version of the bill, and it is subject to a vote. If it passes both 
houses, it goes to the president’s desk.  
 The internal structure and rules of Congress have changed through time, becoming 
more or less centralized as different competing interests jostled over legislative reforms incre-
mentally without rationalizing the whole system.42 However, Congress’ disaggregated structure 
has often given small minorities of enterprising legislators many tools to block bills that they do 
not like. These powers are self-reinforcing. In order to change the rules to remove the vetoes 
held by powerful legislative minorities, it is necessary to go through the gauntlet, where their 
vetoes are encountered, and nothing changes. Examples of this are the powers held by commit-
tee chairmen in the Senate as a result of the seniority system during the first half of the 20th 
century, and the Senate filibuster.43 
On whose behalf are legislators going to use their veto power? Special and vested inter-
ests. In France and the United Kingdom, special and vested interests are forced to negotiate di-
rectly with the government given that it is the government which has the power to give or with-
hold the favors, exemptions, and rents that they want. In these countries, the government has 
the constitutional power to originate laws and generally has fewer problems passing bills 
through disciplined legislatures.  
In the American system, the president may not originate laws; legislative initiative be-
longs solely to members of the legislative branch. Although American presidents are positioned 
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within the political system to have significant agenda-setting powers, the extent of that power 
pales in comparison to that of French and British executives.44 The relative lack of party disci-
pline in the United States, the likelihood of divided government, the lack of an overall legislative 
order, and the relative prevalence of actors with parochial constituencies and the power to halt 
legislative action, all contribute to the reality that the American president is just ones of many 
interests competing to pressure legislators to vote a certain way. Instead of negotiating primar-
ily with the president, special interests negotiate with individual legislators occupying key bot-
tlenecks. Like presidents, interest groups can reward and punish legislators by developing the 
capacity to influence their re-election chances. As we have seen in Chapter 1, vested and spe-
cial interests are highly motivated to develop that kind of political power.  
It is much cheaper to convince a single legislator to take or withhold a single action than 
it is to convince a whole legislature, or the president of a whole nation to do so. The disaggre-
gated structure of Congress which divides it into “many parts, interests, and classes of citizens,” 
and empowers them with vetoes, affords vested interests the ability to block change much 
more cheaply and effectively than in the United Kingdom and France.45 
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The consequences for the quality and character of government of this state of things are 
most comprehensively detailed in Terry Moe’s “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure.” By com-
paring how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CSPC), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were structured, Moe 
demonstrates that this state of things has some unintended knock-on effects. First, the assign-
ing of the government’s enumerated powers to the legislature shifts the focus of the legislative 
battle away from broad programmatic questions of policy which the public can generally under-
stand to arcane questions of bureaucratic structure. Moe saw this in his study of all three agen-
cies: 
In each case, a coalition of groups representing broad social interests triumphed 
over the narrower, more concentrated interests of business in committing the na-
tion to bold new policies and creating new arrangements for carrying them out. 
 
The policies, however, were never explicitly fought over. They were broadly popu-
lar among the electorate, and political elites of all stripes, including leaders within 
the business community, were quick to voice support for governmental action. All 
this was symbolic. The real battles over policy took place within an arcane realm of 
politics remote from the concerns of ordinary citizens: the politics of structural 
choice. The struggles of genuine consequence were about bureaucratic arrange-
ments, about powers and procedures and critera. These were the choices that 
would determine whether the bold new policies of social regulation would mean 
anything at all in practice. Interest groups speaking for the consumer, labor, and 
environmental movements were counted as victorious not because they commit-
ted government to laudable social goals, but because they won most of the battles 
over structure.46 
 
The second knock-on effect is what happens when you let interest groups write their own bu-
reaucratic legislation, using a disjointed legislature as their conduit. Moe argues that interest 
groups are only interested about their narrow goals and will create bureaucratic structures 
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piecemeal and with little attention to the coherency of government. This is because they are 
held accountable to their performance on a single issue, as opposed to the American and 
French Presidents, and the British Prime Minister, who are held accountable for the concerted 
functioning of the whole government. The third knock-on effect has to do with the incentives 
created by a system with many veto points where it is harder to change bureaucratic structures 
than it is to fight to keep them the same. In the American system, even the friends of bureau-
cratic agencies will face strong incentives to press for arrangements which limit the agency and 
decision-making authority of the structures they are creating. These agency-forcing measures 
may make no technical or administrative sense, but they ensure that if the legislature changes 
hands, if the interest group loses steam, or a hostile president comes to power, the agency will 
be forced to continue to do what proponents initially wanted. This was the case with the Clean 
Air Act of 1970: 
Perhaps most important of all, the designers had aggressively searched for mecha-
nisms by which the agencies could be forced to do a good job. This search led to 
the arsenal of structural weapons for which the Clean Air Act of 1970 is now fa-
mous: painfully explicit goals and criteria, lists of specific substances to be regu-
lated, exact deadlines for agency action and goal attainment, detailed procedures 
to be followed in setting and enforcing standards, citizen suits as a check on agency 
inaction, and pervasive opportunities for judicial review. . . There were compelling 
political reasons for burdening the EPA with all this baggage, but, as the young 
agency struggled to pursue its mandate, the load would take a heavy toll on its 
capacity for effective performance.47 
 
The fourth knock-on effect is the inverse of the third. Given that Congress allows a babel of in-
terests to influence legislation, the bills that come out of Congress will be the result of compro-
mise between different groups. As a result, groups which have a strong material interest in 
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seeing the agency fail at its job will also have a say in how the bureaucracy is structured. This 
“lets the fox into the chicken coop,” as Moe puts it. Hostile interests will push for mechanisms 
which are designed to cripple the agency’s ability to do its job. For example, in the design of 
OSHA, whose mission was to create and enforce workplace safety standards: 
Business. . . succeeded in imposing a fragmented structure that labor had staunchly 
resisted from the beginning. While the secretary did get the authority to set stand-
ards, he was hemmed about by other players with important roles to play. The Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission made final decisions on enforce-
ment actions (subject to court appeal)––and, in practice, it would later reverse or 
reduce a large percentage of penalties assessed by OSHA against business. The Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH). . . was to. . . provide 
the “criteria documents” on which OSHA standard development was to be based. 
OSHA and the Secretary of Labor could not control NIOSH, and its delays, research 
interests, and very different political concerns would later cause many problems 
for them. The courts would also become actively involved, as business exercised its 
statutory rights to challenge virtually every decision OSHA made.  
 
Business was also successful in securing a major role for the states, which were 
encouraged to submit regulatory plans that would preempt federal regulation by 
OSHA. . . It was a potent means of fragmenting government regulation. It was also 
a means of ensuring that regulatory decisions would be made in arenas more sym-
pathetic to business interests, since business has historically done well at the state 
level. 
 
The fifth and final knock-on effect I would like to discuss here is the consequence of the third 
and fourth: the proliferation of veto points and disaggregated structures. The growth of Ameri-
can government over the past two centuries has been towards a multiplication of veto players, 
veto points, and unnecessarily complex structures which replicate and reflect the disjointed-
ness of the institution that created them. Instead of growing flexibly, and then periodically be-
ing revised and rationalized to be easier to control by a centralized executive, as in the French 
and British bureaucracies, the American system has grown spasmodically and in a fractal-like 
pattern of complexity.  
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Delegations of power, authority, and autonomy are rarely made cleanly in the American 
system. The landscape is littered with bizarre bureaucratic arrangements, each with their own 
rules of appointment and control. Some are independent, some are accountable to Congress, 
some are accountable to the president. Other branches are dragged into the bureaucratic fray. 
The judiciary might step in and make law itself, such as by ordering the desegregation of 
schools or by ascribing a specific meaning to vague Congressional statutes. Private litigants or 
state governments may be empowered by statute or by constitutional principles to sue the gov-
ernment to halt the implementation of a law, government program, or executive action.48 Ad-
ministrative courts may be arenas where laws may be challenged by their opponents and de-
layed indefinitely.  
 
Just by examining the process of structuring bureaucracy, we can see how the fortress state’s 
disaggregation of power and great number of veto points makes policy and political structures 
difficult to change and very easy for vested and special interests to veto. George Tsebelis appears 
to approach this as if it were a benign accident of how American institutions are arranged. How-
ever, this paper agrees with Charles A. Beard when he argues in An Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution of the United States that this effect was intentionally created by small groups of 
vested interests looking out for their own: 
Dominant interests quite as often benefit from the prevention of governmental ac-
tion as from positive assistance. They are able to take care of themselves if let alone 
within the circle of protection created by the law. Indeed, most owners of property 
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have as much to fear from positive governmental action as from their inability to 
secure advantageous legislation.49  
 
This paper also goes further, to argue that labyrinthian forms of government place the interests 
of “the many,” large and disorganized majorities, at a disadvantage in relation to the interests of 
“the few,” highly organized and knowledgeable insiders who have an easier time navigating the 
system and operating it from within. It is to this aspect of the fortress state that we now turn. 
 
INSIDER’S GAME 
Modern society has developed many institutions to manage social conflicts of varying scopes 
without resort to mob violence or civil war. These institutions include the state’s monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence, independent legal systems, private arbitration, norms of civility 
and conduct, free and fair elections, lawmaking by elected legislatures, federalism, and local-
ism. From the point of view of the state, these are essential mechanisms for keeping the peace. 
From the point of view of interests below the state, they are the rules of the game which can be 
exploited strategically for the gain of the individuals or groups.  
Because the scope of a conflict determines the balance of forces engaged in it, choosing 
the scope is a crucial component of political strategy.50 Some interests will want to keep a con-
flict localized, where they enjoy an advantage, while others will want to expand its scope where 
their greater numbers will count. It follows that small vested interests will benefit dispropor-
tionately from mechanisms which quarantine conflicts and allow for the creation of “iron 
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triangles,” where their smaller numbers and greater technical and political skill will have an ad-
vantage. Meanwhile, majoritarian impulses will benefit the most from mechanisms which allow 
for an appeal to the society as a whole. These mechanisms allow the majority’s greater weight 
in numbers to count. In the United States, mechanisms which socialize conflicts are compara-
tively weak, while mechanisms which isolate them are comparatively strong.  
 The disaggregation of the American system allows special and vested interests to “shop 
around” for the best instrument to achieve their goals. Often, these are local structures of gov-
ernment like school boards, city councils, and state governments whose elections take place at 
different times than national bodies, and whose activities are generally not being monitored by 
the community. Local elections are low-turnout affairs.51 By the way in which they are ar-
ranged, they isolate small segments of the electorate and give them disproportionate amounts 
of power over public policy. 
 This is most evident in elections for school boards across the country. These bodies are 
typically local entities created by state governments to administer property taxes raised for the 
purpose of running local public schools. Elections for school board are often held in off-years, 
when no other major office such as governor or president is up for grabs. This isolation from 
other elected officials ensures that the elections are also usually non-partisan, which eliminates 
the potential nationalizing effect of a party label and party discipline. The relative inattention of 
mainstream voters and isolation of these bodies makes them particularly susceptible to capture 
by a small, self-serving group of people who turn out disproportionately in these elections to 
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keep themselves in power. Sometimes, this self-dealing can have disastrous consequences for 
the quality of education in public schools, as Moe found in his study of the New Orleans public 
school system before it was wiped out by Katrina:  
The elected OPSB had jurisdiction over more than 100 public schools and 66,000 
students. For decades prior to 2005, it operated a system of patronage politics that 
was common in many city school systems. Board members routinely interfered in 
hiring decisions in order to secure jobs for friends and family. Principals, often pat-
ronage appointees themselves, had little say in the staffing of their own schools. . . 
According to the state auditor, for example, the central office’s accounting depart-
ment was so full of patronage appointees and former school personnel that it failed 
to employ a single accountant.  
 
The board also controlled the district purse strings and made decisions about which 
firms to contract with for construction, advertising, cafeteria food, legal services, 
security, maintenance services, architectural services, evaluation services, insur-
ance services, professional development, curricula, and the like. Members awarded 
inflated no-bid contracts to friends and campaign contributors, sometimes for work 
never completed. Patronage allowed board members to strengthen their political 
appeal and, in cases of outright corruption, to profit directly.52 
 
Such structures are also ideal for small, highly concentrated, and highly organized economic in-
terests who have a vested interest in how schools are run, such as teachers. Terry Moe found in 
a number of other studies that teachers and allied staff turn out more frequently in these elec-
tions than any other social groups. For example, in the Charter Oak School District which Moe 
studied, only 7 percent of registered voters turned out in 1997, while 46 percent of teachers 
did. In the Katrina case, the local union, the Unified Teachers of New Orleans (UTNO), had a 
membership which approached 75% of New Orleans teachers and raked in $3 million in dues. 
Moe found that UTNO was the most active player in local elections for the New Orleans school 
board. Union members tended to turnout at 70 to 80 percent in elections which drew only 25% 
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to 35% of registered voters. UTNO was consistently the top contributor to school district mem-
bers’ election campaigns, and its endorsement was highly sought after in city council, state leg-
islature, and judicial elections. Daniel DiSalvo explains in his book, Government Against Itself: 
Huge information asymmetries help explain many outcomes. The “rationally igno-
rant” public pays little attention to public sector labor relations, while the unions 
are preoccupied with it. Law professor Richard Epstein has described collective bar-
gaining in government as “an unfair match” between voters on one side and public 
officials and unions on the other because politicians can “escape voter wrath by 
granting public employees highly favorable, but less visible” pay and benefit pack-
ages. Furthermore, over the long term, negotiated work rules can even push public 
policy down paths that neither elected officials nor voters truly desire.53 
 
In the New Orleans case, the result of union power meant that much of the policy that should 
have (on paper) been decided by the democratically elected representatives of the New Orle-
ans community were instead dictated to it by the union in its collective bargaining contract: 
The 159 page labor agreement in place prior to Katrina not only set the salary 
schedule and provided for various fringe benefits, but also covered the length of 
the school day, the list of paid holidays, rules for textbook adoption, rules for how 
often school administrators could use the public address system, minimum disci-
plinary punishments for students, maximum class sizes by grade. . . Senior teachers 
had priority in filling new jobs that opened up, severely limiting principals’ discre-
tion in hiring. And once teachers landed their jobs, principals essentially had no 
authority to get bad performers out of the classroom.54 
 
In many places, state governments have been forced to step in to set minimum standards for 
the operation of local governments. By removing some of the discretionary authority of local 
governments and monitoring their activities and expenditures vigilantly through state comp-
troller’s offices, state governments have been able to reduce the level of corruption and self-
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dealing at the local level. However, state governments may themselves be susceptible to the 
same form of pressure and cooptation from organized groups. The response of teachers’ unions 
to being regulated from above has often been to organize at the state and national level for 
regulations which disproportionately favor them. Terry Moe found in another study that from 
2000 to 2009, the political spending of teachers’ unions outpaced those of all business groups 
combined in 36 out of 50 states. In the New York, for example, all teachers are guaranteed 
yearly pay raises, even if the school district cannot afford it or a teacher has been performing 
poorly. In the New Orleans case, state law granted teachers tenure automatically after three 
years, making it impossible to fire the worst teachers, even if they were known to be engaging 
in criminal acts.55 
Local governments are not the only institutions which are skewed towards small, highly 
interested minorities. As we have seen, the labyrinthian and disjointed structure of Congress 
makes it very difficult for strong national political parties to emerge. In the vacuum, special in-
terests provide to legislators the kinds of organization, legislative expertise, exposure, rewards, 
and favors that political parties or the government might provide in other systems. Pressure 
politics is not the most accessible or public-friendly kind of politics. The kinds of organization 
that effective public pressure requires––a presence in Washington D.C., the ability to court leg-
islators, the ability to understand and keep up with bills traveling through both chambers, the 
ability to influence the re-election of key legislators, an understanding of the laws and institu-
tions at play, connections and credibility with major players, the ability to argue in 
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administrative hearings––provide daunting obstacles to ordinary people wanting to take action 
based on majoritarian concerns that they feel only weakly. Conversely, these institutions re-
ward professionals who are highly motivated to learn how the system works and how to influ-
ence it. 
 
ACCEDING TO CHANGE INCREMENTALLY 
We have seen that the American system possesses by design an incredible capacity to dilute, 
divide, and halt forces attempting to bring about policy or institutional change. This is how the 
fortress state, and the vested interests within it, defend themselves. However, if the winds of 
discontent are strong enough, if the forces in favor of change are organized and dispersed enough 
across many places and many elections, the system will give. It will do so slowly, incrementally, 
one institution at a time. Battles within institutions will be fierce. Victories will be partial, incom-
plete, and leave attackers exhausted and depleted. Over the course of this long war, institutions 
may be retaken by the defending forces, and progress made by the attackers undone. Reformers 
may find themselves unable to perfectly remake the system, instead forced to layer their changes 
on top of the institutions that already exist. They may also find it easier to accept small, particu-
laristic payoffs than to initiate sweeping reforms in the public interest. However, if faced with 
enough sustained pressure, the system will give. The Jacksonians, the Progressives, the Suffra-
gettes, the Prohibitionists, Labor, the Civil Rights Reformers, the LGBTQ Activists, the Conserva-
tives, among others, will eventually succeed in making their mark on the system. 
 Given the sheer number of opportunities to move the cause one increment forward––to 
bring reform to one city or one state, to one institution instead of a whole country, the 
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disaggregated American system is able to channel discontent into itself far better than a win-
ner-take-all system. In France, discontent against Emmanuel Macron takes the form of riots in 
the streets, blocked highways, lost tourism revenue, and lost economic growth. In the United 
States, discontent against Donald Trump takes the form of a surge in special House and Senate 
elections for the loyal opposition, increased activism within the Democratic Party, increased en-
gagement with local and state races, and, within two years, a Democratic House with the ability 
to say no. Discontent and conflict which could undermine the state is instead fed back into it. 
 Once reformers achieve the change they seek, however imperfectly they achieve it, they 
discover that the fortress state’s defenses can also be used to protect their hard-earned privi-
leges and reforms. Very often, this leads them to join the fortress state’s defenders on the bat-
tlements. By acceding to change in this way, the fortress state turns its most vehement and 
powerful critics into staunch defenders. The most brilliant part is that it does not have to en-
tirely transform itself in doing so, which could potentially be explosive and upsetting to inter-
ests already vested in the status quo.  
The longevity of the American Constitution (penned 1786) is a testament to the effec-
tiveness of the fortress state as an instrument for handling political, social, and economic 
change over the long term in a large and complex society. As noted in the introduction, policy 
and institutional stability is not necessarily a bad thing. Given this paper’s focus on political de-
velopment and institutional reform, it is inevitable that we focus primarily on the darker side of 
policy stability, which in Tsebelis’ words consists of “the inability of the political system to re-
spond to changes occurring in the economic, political, or social environment.”56 The design of 
                                                        
56 Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, 2011. 207. 
FORTRESS AMERICA 51 
the fortress state renders American government is disjointed and dysfunctional, incapable of 
delivering on services that more centralized and decisive governments are able to. However, it 
is also important to remember that not all policy or institutional change is desirable. Hamilton 
was correct in observing the institutions can be changed for the worse much more easily than 
they can be changed for the better.  
Institutional and policy stability can also be desirable for its own reasons. Tsebelis ob-
serves that, another “way of conceiving policy stability is as a credible commitment of the polit-
ical system not to interfere in economic, political, or social interactions and regulate them.” 57 It 
is a very common and credible view in political science and economics that economic systems 
and markets need stable rules which are difficult to change in order to function and grow 
properly.58 For example, Witold Henisz uses data to find that when a political system cannot 
change the rules of the economic game, investment and growth rates tend to be higher.59 A 
similar argument can be made for the rules of the political game: the ability of a political system 
to legitimately and fairly referee political disputes and reconcile conflicting interests might be 
difficult to maintain if political players are empowered to change the rules to suit themselves.  
 A particular view of political and social change has emerged out of this institutional real-
ity. The American view is that “progress” takes a long time. It happens incrementally, organi-
cally, in a decentralized way, after hard-fought battles. Liberals might be frustrated that it does 
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not come fast enough. They may be ridiculed as cranks and pie-in-the-sky idealists who do not 
understand how the system works, but they can take comfort in the fact that the franchise was 
eventually extended to all men, women, and minorities, that slavery was abolished, that the 
New Deal did triumph, that the civil rights movement did succeed. Victories might be incom-
plete now, and there may be unconscionable conservatives engaging in a rear-guard action 
against the advance of history, but liberals can look to the future with the assurance that more 
progress is coming.60 Conservatives, too, can take comfort in the idea of progress. As Walter 
Russell Mead observed of the conservative mindset: 
Change will come––must come, should come––but it will come at a slow and ac-
ceptable pace. It will be domesticated; the outlandish will become familiar before 
we must accept it. . . The heart and soul of Anglo-American conservatism is the 
belief that an organic process of development, even if sometimes slow in the short 
run, will in the long run be the most effective way of facilitating improvement and 
change.61 
 
This is a consequence of how American institutions are arranged. 
  
                                                        
60 Mead, Walter Russell. God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World. New York, NY: 
Knopf, 2008. 306-307. 
61 Mead, Walter Russell. God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World. New York, NY: 
Knopf, 2008. 307-308. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Due to the disjointed and fractal-like nature of American government, and the fevered, con-
fused, and polarized state of American politics, it is increasingly difficult for students coming of 
age in the new millennium to conceptualize of the American the system in its entirety. There is 
too much going on. There are too many actors making too many claims; too many bodies with 
too many rules; too many worthwhile issues and grievances clamoring for recognition; too 
much urgency, and too little perspective; too much information and not enough patience to di-
gest it properly. That is why I wrote The Fortress State, to arrive at a simple but comprehensive 
framework which explains how the system’s parts relate to the whole––if only because I 
wanted to leave my senior year less confused than when I entered it.  
Mass democracy in the age of the internet––in which the pace of change is measured 
not in years or decades, but in days and hours––is baffled when it encounters the glacial for-
tress state. It is an unstoppable force hitting an immovable object. As I suggest throughout this 
paper, this is not an unprecedented occurrence. The Atlantic tide of democratization of the 
early 1800’s, the abolitionist fever of the mid-century, the reformist movements of the turn of 
the 20th, the argument for woman’s suffrage, movements for decolonization and an end to ra-
cial discrimination, the rise of consumerism and global capitalism, etc, etc, all had this same un-
stoppable, transnational character. The degree to which the institutions are transformed during 
these moments says just as much about the institutions themselves as the pressures trying to 
change them.  
 But there are things about this moment which are different, which are signs of change. 
Americans are coming to realize that the institutions they inherited from the Greatest 
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Generation are not working as well as they used to. What is wrong, who is responsible, and 
how to fix it, is a subject of debate and acrimony both within and between the two major politi-
cal parties. No one solution, no one ‘theory of the problem,’ has emerged to rule them all. The 
political system which ensures that society will be broken into “many parts, interests, and clas-
ses of citizens” continues to operate effectively––perhaps even more effectively than before. 
What all can see for absolute certain is that there is more acrimony, more conflict, more confu-
sion, and more polarization than at any time in recent memory. It has not been uncommon in 
my classes, whenever the conversation has turned to current events, for the professor to com-
ment, “I know your generation grew up with this, so this normal for you. But this is NOT normal.” 
As with all stories of political development, our present moment is a complex mixture of change 
and continuity. There are two worthwhile questions to ask about it. First, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, what does the fortress state protect? Who is most advantaged and ad-
vantaged by it? Second, how are these tensions likely to be resolved by the balance of interests 
and incentives within the American political process? In the space I have left, I will explore 
these two questions by discussing what I believe to be the demise of the majoritarian presi-
dency and the consequences it will have for American political development.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA DISAGGREGATION ON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
When Sydney Blumenthal penned The Permanent Campaign documenting how Ronald Reagan 
perfected the use of consultants and media advisors to harness the news cycle and drive up 
presidential approval numbers, there were only eight television channels. Only a few block-
buster movies were released each year. Only a few major corporate newspapers had the 
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resources and scale needed to reach a national audience. Blumenthal did not know it, but he 
was documenting the end, rather than the beginning of an era. Within a decade, satellite and 
cable television brought many more channels. The possibility of wall-to-wall political coverage 
for those interested in politics was opened up, while those less interested in politics could opt 
out entirely because they had something else to watch. Newt Gingrich discovered a powerful 
new tool for reaching narrow but highly excitable constituencies through the new television 
channel C-SPAN. With better technology, the rise of the internet and smartphones, of websites 
like YouTube and Facebook, the cost of creating content and reaching large audiences dramati-
cally decreased. Sites like Netflix and YouTube created repositories of functionally unlimited en-
tertainment to suit any narrow taste or particularity. The new technologies allowed small stars 
and firms to touch people more immediately and personally. This explosion of choice in enter-
tainment, communication, and news was hailed by techno-futurists and democratic enthusiasts 
as the best thing to happen to democracy since mass literacy, but recent developments have 
caused Americans to take a second look at the internet and how it is impacting society. 
 The disaggregation of the media landscape has an important consequence for the bal-
ance between narrow and majoritarian interests in democracy. It is important to remember 
that the media is also an institution which responds to and creates incentives. Democratic and 
development theorists have long recognized the importance of a free and independent media 
to keeping government accountable to majoritarian interests. However, I am sure that outlets 
like Breitbart, Fox News, and MSNBC––whose business strategies are to appeal to small and in-
tense constituencies while sacrificing mass appeal––were not what they had in mind.  
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 When technology limited us to three television channels, a handful of national newspa-
pers, and comparatively few alternatives for entertainment, for-profit corporations like the 
New York Times could recoup the cost of distributing information by taking advantage of econo-
mies of scale. In order to do this, they needed to appeal to as broad an audience as possible. As 
a result, the New York Times tended to appeal to interests and concerns which touched all 
Americans––albeit weakly. Americans, who tended not to have access to outlets which targeted 
them specifically based on narrower and more intense concerns, were more likely to feel and 
respond to these majoritarian interests.  
 No political office was more impacted by this state of things than the presidency. As the 
national head and the center of concerted action in the American system, the expectations and 
demands of the American people as a whole were centered on the president. Every day, the 
Washington Press Corps reported on what the president said, did, and stood for. This relation-
ship between a national media, a national president, and a nation was made possible by a cen-
tralized media landscape. It created strong incentives for the president to stand by majoritarian 
priorities and gave the president’s “bully pulpit” an incredible amount of power to frame the 
national conversation, to set the agenda in Washington, and to cajole more particularistic ac-
tors into taking his side.  
 What has occurred with the rise of cable television and the internet has been the break-
down and particularization of this mechanism. News companies like Fox News, Breitbart, and 
MSNBC appeal to small and intense constituencies as a business strategy, and reward political 
actors which are willing to take harsh particularistic stands. The national media was previously 
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an instrument for majoritarian pressure. It is now an instrument for particularistic pressure, 
with consequences for how political actors behave while in office and on the campaign trail. 
 
CHANGES IN THE PROCESS FOR NOMINATING PRESIDENTS 
It cannot be said that the process of nominating American presidents was ever a majoritarian 
exercise. Before reforms in the 70’s and 80’s which instituted a system of binding primaries, 
party leaders attending conventions as part of state delegations bargained away their votes in a 
highly complex ballad of backroom maneuvering. Political entrepreneurs controlling the votes 
of key states such as Ohio, Chicago, and New York would routinely gridlock conventions in order 
to extract promises of government jobs, appointments, favors, contracts, and other privileges 
from the winning candidates. Meanwhile, potentially hundreds of rounds of balloting unfolded 
on the convention floor. This system may have been woefully undemocratic and may have 
forced many candidates to sacrifice some of the effectiveness of the national government to 
reward political allies. However, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue in their book How 
Democracies Die, party leaders were also highly conservative in their choice of nominees.62 
They tended to gravitate towards candidates whom they knew had experience as campaigners, 
had a track record of keeping their promises to their allies, and had mass appeal. After all, they 
could extract any promise they wanted at the convention, but if that candidate went on to lose 
in the general election because their appeal was too particularistic, there would be no spoils, no 
jobs, no contracts, and no cabinet appointments. Further, if a candidate was inexperienced and 
                                                        
62 Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. London: Penguin, 2019. 
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had no connections to the party establishment––such as extreme and potentially authoritarian 
candidates like Charles Lindenberg––the chances of their reneging on their promises once in 
office were higher.63 These two considerations, that candidates needed to win, and needed to 
be loyal, made the party nomination system select for candidates who had mass appeal and 
were experienced with the political system.  
  The incentives of the new primary system have become evident in the last decade, as 
they took a while to come into full flowering. In switching the party nomination system to one 
based on state primaries rather than on state conventions, reformers perhaps imagined that 
they were opening up the selection of political nominees to the people at large. George McGov-
ern, who won the Democratic nomination in 1972 unexpectedly, referred to the primary system 
as “the most open political process in our history.” Unfortunately, as we now know, asking vot-
ers to turn out in more than one election a year places a barrier to collective action which se-
lects for voters which are more motivated than others. Party primaries tend to be dominated 
by voters who are motivated by narrow ideological, vested, or identarian interests which they 
feel very strongly.  
The party nomination system effectively swapped one kind of small, highly motivated 
interest for another. But are the incentives the same? Unfortunately, they are quite the oppo-
site. Primary voters motivated by ideology, identity, or vested interest do not have to bear the 
consequences of their decision to vote for a particularistic candidate in the same way that party 
                                                        
63 Party machines were reminded of this in a drastic way in 1910 when the New Jersey Democratic machine nomi-
nated Princeton President Woodrow Wilson, to the governorship of that state. The machine assumed that, as a 
political novice, he would be a loyal and pliable governor. But barely had they nominated him that Wilson turned 
on them and campaigned as a Progressive against the machine, won, and continued his war against them from the 
governor’s seat. 
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leaders did. Party leaders were strongly incentivized to pick a candidate who could win, who 
was reliable, and who followed political norms, because their political futures and electoral 
chances depended on it. Meanwhile, the particularism of primary voters makes them more 
likely to insist on presidential candidates who reflect their narrow and particularistic shibbo-
leths. Primary voters want their presidential candidates to deliver just as much as party leaders 
did back in the day. But unlike party leaders, primary voters in presidential contests are after 
the zero-sum triumph of their narrow issue, identity, or ideology over others. For party leaders 
back in the day, the best way to ensure that a candidate would follow through on their prom-
ises was to insist on political experience and connections. For primary voters, the best way to 
ensure a candidate’s reliability is by insisting on authenticity––a candidate’s genuine, strict, and 
long-lasting adherence to the identity or creed that the particular interest believes in. Primary 
voters will therefore favor political virgins and radicals over seasoned politicians. Primaries have 
become fraught zero-sum contests between small groups because it is very difficult for candi-
dates to represent multiple groups authentically all at once. The result of this process is a par-
ticularistic presidential candidate, one who does not necessarily have the same experience, 
broad appeal, and connections that presidential candidates tended to have in the past. 
 
THE PARTICULARIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND THE BAD PRESIDENT PROBLEM 
The combination of these two changes to our political system––the disaggregation of our media 
and the particularization of the presidential nomination process––has resulted in two related 
problems, the particularization of the presidency and the bad president problem. 
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The American presidency is our constitutional system’s answer to collective action prob-
lems. The President is the embodiment of both “the one” and “the many.” He defends both the 
interests of the state and of the American people as a whole, a counterweight to the particular-
istic interests represented in Congress. In order to fulfill its constitutional function, the presi-
dency requires that it be occupied by someone motivated to use the instruments of the na-
tional administrative state to respond to these interests and to ignore the babel of particularis-
tic interests. In the past, strong incentives existed in both the presidential nomination and me-
dia systems to reinforce the pressures of “the many” and lift the president above the power of 
“the few.” However, over the past thirty years, these pressures have been reversed. The presi-
dent is now rewarded for taking particularistic stands which enflame social tensions and for sac-
rificing the effectiveness of the national bureaucracy to appease particularistic constituencies. 
Meanwhile, it is getting much harder for the president to appeal to a nation which is increas-
ingly segmented into particularistic media bubbles, and which does not respond to broad and 
unifying appeals as it once did. This is a systemic problem which will not go away when Donald 
Trump leaves office. The problems of the particularistic presidency will recur until we change 
the incentives which created it. 
  Over the past hundred years, the presidency has amassed a great amount of power and 
responsibility. It is a huge job, one that involves a great amount of experience, organization, 
connections, and talent. While it is still possible for experienced and well-prepared members of 
the political class to attain the presidency, the filters which made it impossible for incompetent, 
radical, or authoritarian presidents to reach the office no longer exist. In the years to come, the 
American political system may from time to time be subjected to a “Bad President Problem,” 
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where the highest and most powerful office in the land is occupied for at least four years by an 
individual who is either unwilling to or incapable of fulfilling the presidency’s traditional role.  
How much of a problem is this likely to be? Three years of Donald Trump have demon-
strated how the fortress state can protect us from the worst effects of an incompetent admin-
istration. Left alone, the economy has continued to grow. Jobs are still being created. People 
are still going to school, getting married, and pursuing happiness. In instances where the fed-
eral government has been incapable to fulfill a particular function, the redundancy and incen-
tives of the American system have empowered other branches and levels of government to 
step in. For example, state governments stepped in to keep the airports open during the 2018-
2019 government shutdown. State Attorneys General offices controlled by the loyal opposition 
have taken on a new constitutional role as a check on executive overreach, corruption, incom-
petence, and statutory noncompliance.  
However, in the absence of concerted national leadership, collective action problems 
which touch us all weakly, but which we all suffer from, remain unaddressed. Some of the big-
gest problems of the 21st century are collective action problems, such as climate change, gov-
ernment insolvency due to demographic changes, the rise in social alienation and anti-social be-
havior, the rise in the risk of nuclear war between superpowers, decaying roads and bridges, 
pervasive rent-seeking behavior, the burden imposed on families by overpriced healthcare, 
large-scale health crises like the rise in “deaths of despair” and instances of mental and physical 
disabilities, a labor market in drift that no longer serves the interests of employees as well as it 
once did, etc. Powerful interests, when left to themselves, can look after themselves. But weak 
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interests, both of the narrow and the broad kind, have trouble. It is these which are most likely 
to suffer under the new state of things. 
 
Due to recent developments, it appears like the American government is growing increasingly 
incapable of imposing losses on small, powerful interest groups, of responding to majoritarian 
interests, and defending its interests abroad. This has always been a core aspect of the design 
of the fortress state, though Americans have in the past been able to achieve a healthy balance 
between the interests of “the many” and disorganized, “the few” and organized, and “the one” 
by empowering a national and majoritarian presidency. This is how Americans conquered the 
Great Depression, the Second World War, and the Cold War. However, in the 21st century, 
Americans have inadvertently dismantled by small, incremental, and uncoordinated changes 
the very institutions which made this balance possible. The jury is still out on whether these in-
cremental changes carried out by sub-national actors following their own interests will lead 
American political development on a more positive path than what a centrally-planned intelli-
gence might be able to achieve, or if they will destabilize forever the careful and fortunate bal-
ance we struck during the 20th century. Here, we might be able to discern two philosophies. 
Those who believe in the “invisible hand” argue that, while we don’t know what the terminus of 
progress is, we should trust the process and endure the disruptions it imposes as best we can. 
Then, there are those who doubt that thousands of smaller actors, pursuing their own narrow 
interests, will serve a larger interest without first being incentivized to do so by the norms, mor-
als, or institutions of a society. I fall into the latter category, which is why I chose to focus my 
conclusion on the American presidency. 
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The United States enters the 21st century, the century of global collective action prob-
lems, with a disaggregated frame of government which was created in the 18th for a small 
agrarian republic on the shores of the New World. That system of government, the fortress 
state, has proved to be one of the luckiest and most resilient in the world. This was not preor-
dained. The Founders understood that governments function according to rules and incentives. 
They carefully balanced their institutions and the interests of society against one-another in or-
der to achieve the results they wanted. We revere the Founders, but very few of us are still able 
to see the American government as they once did: as one big system, greater than the sum of 
its parts, where every part contributes to the character and outcomes of the whole. It was the 
majoritarian president’s role to apprehend the system in this way, but we dismantled him. The 
system can continue to function without him, but we should still be aware of what we are los-
ing, and why, as political development takes its course in the 21st century.  
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